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Abstract
The monthly frequency of price-changes is a prominent feature of
many studies of the CPI micro-data. In this paper, we see how much
this ties down the behavior of price-setters ("rms") in steady-state in
terms of the average length of price-spells across rms. We are able to
divide an upper and lower bound for the mean duration of price-spells
averaged across rms. We use the UK CPI data at the aggregate and
sectoral level and nd that the actual mean is about twice the theo-
retical minimum consistent with the observed frequency. We estimate
the distribution using the hazard function and nd that although the
estimated hazard di¤ers signicantly from the Calvo distribution, the
means and medians are similar. However, despite the micro di¤er-
ences, we nd that the articial Calvo distributions generated using
the sectoral frequencies result in very similar impulse responses to the
estimated hazards when used in the Smets-Wouters (2003) model.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there have been many studies using comprehensive micro-
data on pricing. In the Euro area, there has been the ination persistence
network (IPN ) consisting of national studies of the CPI and PPI microdata1,
which are summarized in Alvarez et al (2006). In the US there have been
similar studies: Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2008)2. One common focus of these studies has been
the statistic of the proportion of prices changing per month (this can either
be an average over several months, or a monthly statistic). This statistic can
be presented in several ways, depending on the level of disaggregation and
the treatment of temporary sales and so on. In this paper, we seek to ana-
lyze what this statistic implies for the behavior of rms (or more accurately
price-setters) in the economy. Each period rms set prices: they may either
choose to leave the price unchanged or to change it. The proportion of rms
resetting price corresponds to the proportion of prices changing (for simplic-
ity we take a 1-1 correspondence between rms and prices). The prices of
some product types change frequently (e.g. gasoline, tomatoes) and some
very infrequently.
We can think of the CPI dataset as a panel of observations, each cross-
section corresponding to the prices set by "rms" at that date. The cross-
sectional mean completed price spell can be seen as capturing the mean
behavior of the price-setters, which represents the "structure" of the economy
in this respect (i.e. the average behavior of the rms in the economy). For
a given frequency of price change, what can we infer about the behavior of
the rms? In this paper we are able to derive a lower bound (and an upper
bound) for the mean length of price-spells across rms, interpreted as the
cross-sectional mean completed price-spell. The cross-sectional distribution
is needed if we are to model price-setting as a Taylor process. We then use
the UK CPI data for the period 1996-2007 and consider frequency data at
three di¤erent levels of disaggregation: the 11 sector COICOP, the 67 sector
COICOP and the highest possible level of disaggregation at 570 items, to
see how the actual data on price-spell durations compares to the theoretical
minimum. We nd that the actual mean estimated from the CPI is 10.9
months, which is 62-90% higher than the theoretical minima generated from
the frequency data. This is not surprising, in Proposition 1 we nd that
the theoretical minimum consistent with a given frequency is only attained
if all price-spells have the same or almost the same duration, whilst the
1See Beaudry et al (2007) and Alvarez and Hernando (2006) for France and Spain inter
alia.
2See Bunn and Ellis (2012) for the UK and Baharad and Eden (2004) for Israel.
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actual distribution contains a lot of heterogeneity in durations which implies
a longer cross-sectional mean.
We also interpret the frequency data under the hypothesis that within
the sector the frequency is generated by a Calvo distribution, as has been
assumed in applied work by Dixon and Kara (2010, 2011). We look at this in
two ways. First, we aggregate over all sectors to derive the aggregate distri-
bution under this assumption: thus we have the distribution of durations in
each sector and for each duration we aggregate over sectors using the sectoral
CPI weights. We can then compare this to the "true" distribution derived
from the estimated hazard function.
 The aggregate distribution derived under the Calvo hypothesis at the
sectoral level has a similar mean and median to the true distribution,
with the mean increasing with the level of disaggregation. For example,
the 570-item model yields a mean of 10.8 and median of 7.8 months,
whilst the true values are 10.9 and 7.8 respectively.
 However, the implied Calvo distributions di¤er to the true distribution
in signicant ways: (i) there is a 12 month spike in the true distribution
absent from the Calvo distributions, (ii) the proportion of short price-
spells (1-3 months) is less in the Calvo than in the true distribution.
We also examine whether the Calvo is a good t in each of the 11 COICOP
sectors. Since the data set is large, even small deviations of the actual dis-
tribution from the hypothetical Calvo distribution cause the Calvo null to
be rejected under the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is indeed the case.
However, whilst in some sectors the hypothesized Calvo distribution looks
completely di¤erent (for example in Health which has a very large 12 month
spike), in others the Calvo looks more similar (Transportation). There is
clearly a variety of patterns across sectors3 when we compare the true distri-
butions within the 11 COICOP sectors.
Whilst the Calvo distributional hypothesis might not provide a good sta-
tistical t in terms of the aggregate or sectoral distributions, does this matter
in terms of how the economy behaves? Since the Calvo hypothesis yields a
mean and median close to the true distribution, perhaps the di¤erences will
not result in di¤erent behavior of the economy in terms of impulse response
functions. We explore this in the context of two macro models: a sim-
ple Quantity Theory model and the Smets and Wouters (2003) Euro area
model. The pricing models used are the Generalized Taylor and Calvo as in
3This heterogeneity across sectors was also found in the French data by Fougere et al
(2007).
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Dixon and Le Bihan (2012), which are both consistent with any micro dis-
tributions of durations and can be calibrated to the true data and the data
under the Calvo distributional hypothesis. What we nd is that the impulse
response functions for output and ination are very similar when we use the
true distribution and hypothetical Calvo distribution at the di¤erent levels
of disaggregation for both the Generalized Taylor and Generalized Calvo. In
the Smets-Wouters model, the IRFs are almost identical. This indicates that
if we are interested in modelling macroeconomic properties of an economy,
using the sectoral frequency data under the Calvo distributional hypothe-
sis might be a useful shortcut and alternative to estimating the distribution
using the hazard function. Indeed, where the actual hazard is not avail-
able or not estimated reliably, we can be condent that the use of sectoral
frequencies with the Calvo distributional hypothesis can be a good working
approximation.
The structure of the paper is follows. In Section 2, we give a theoretical
description of the steady state distributions of durations. In Section 3, we
derive the propositions in which the average duration across rms consistent
with the mean frequency of price changes. We show an application to the UK
CPI data in Section 4. In Section 5, we simulate a quantitative theory model
and a Smets-Wouters model, both with Generalized Taylor and Generalized
Calvo price-setting respectively. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Steady state distributions of durations.
The statistical framework for understanding the CPI microdata is outlined in
detail by Dixon (2012), so in this paper we just summarize in a less technical
manner the key properties needed for this paper.
There is a continuum of price-setting rms f 2 [0; 1] ; time is discrete4
and innite t 2 Z+ = f0; 1; 2:::1g : The price set by rm f at time t is pft. A
price spell is a duration, a sequence of consecutive periods that have the same
price. For every ft; fg  [0; 1]  Z+ we can assign an integer d(t; f) which
is the duration of the price-spell to which pft belongs5. The distribution of
price-spell durations is simply the proportions of all durations having length
i = 1:::F : d =

di
	F
i=1
2 F 1. We assume a steady-state, so that the
distribution of durations of new price-spells is the same for each new cohort
4Typically, CPI data are collected on a monthly basis, the price observations being
obtained in the rst two weeks of the calender month.
5Note that in assigning an integer to a duration, we start with 1 by convention: it
would be equally valid to start with 0. With our convention, a new price-spell is 1 month
old, rather than becoming 1 on completion of the rst month.
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of price-spells. This means that the distribution of all price-spells is exactly
the same as the distribution of new price spells at any period.
Whilst the distribution of durations d 2 F 1 is one way of looking at
the microdata, it ignores the panel structure of the data. Each row of the
panel is a trajectory of prices corresponding to a particular rm (or more
accurately product sold at an outlet). Each column is a cross-section of all of
the prices set by rms at a point in time. The cross-sectional distribution of
completed price-spell durations is  2 F 1. In e¤ect, we take a represen-
tative t, and for each rm we see the completed price-spell duration at that
time d(f; t): i is then the proportion of rms that set prices for i periods.
Equivalently, it is the proportion of price-spells at any time t which last for
i periods.
The proportion of rms re-setting price each month is denoted as h : in
the UK this is equal to 21%: We dene the mean duration6 of price-spells
across the panel as a whole as
d
 
d

=
FX
i=1
idi
and cross-sectional mean (across rms) as
T () =
FX
i=1
ii (1)
Note that the cross sectional mean in general be larger than the mean
duration T  d: this is because in cross-section you have length-biased
sampling, since the probability of a price-spell being observed in cross-section
is proportional to its duration. Indeed, the two can be equal ( T = d) if and
only if F = dF = 1; so that all price-spells are F months long and there is
no heterogeneity to generate a length bias.
From Dixon (2012), we know that7:
h = d 1 (2)
=
FX
i=1
i
i
(3)
6Again, this way of dening the mean is consistent with our convention of assigning the
integer 1 to the rst time period. Had we instead assigned a 0 to this value, then we would
have the expression
PF
i=1(i   1)i (as we do with human ages). An equally acceptable
measure is to take the midpoint and have
PF
i=1(i   0:5)i We can move between these
denitions simply by adding or subtracting a constant.
7In continuous time, we have d =   1
log(1 h) ; which allows for the price to change more
than once per period. Again, we are using a discrete time setting in which durations are
integer valued.
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That is, the proportion of rms resetting price is equal to the reciprocal of
the mean duration d. Furthermore, the proportion of rms resetting price is
related to the cross-sectional distribution by equation (3) : In steady-state,
a proportion i 1 of the i i duration rms reset their price. The aggregate
proportion is simply the sum over the durations i = 1:::F .
3 The average duration across rms consis-
tent with h¯.
Now, for a given frequency h there are many possible distributions across
rms (DAF)  2 F 1 consistent with identity (3) and each distribution re-
sults in a corresponding mean across rms T (): We can dene the mapping
H
 
h

: [0; 1]! F 1
H
 
h

=
(
 2 F 1 :
FX
i=1
i
i
= h
)
H
 
h

is the set of all DAFs which are consistent with a given mean duration
of price-spells d expressed in terms of the corresponding proportion of rms
resetting prices h. Clearly, since the maximum duration is F , we have h 
F 1 so that H is non-empty. Since H
 
h

is dened by a linear restriction
on the sector shares , H
 
h
  F 2 and is closed and bounded. We can
then ask what is the minimum (maximum) T consistent with a given h.
Since H
 
h

is non-empty, closed and bounded, with T () continuous, both
a maximum and a minimum will exist. Turning to the minimization problem
rst, we have:
min T () s:t:  2 H  h (4)
Proposition 1 Let min 2 F 1 solve (4) to give the shortest average con-
tract length Tmin.
(a) No more than two sectors i have values greater than zero
(b) If there are two sectors i > 0, j > 0 then will be consecutive
integers (ji  jj = 1).
(c) There is one solution i¤ h 1 = k 2 Z+. In this case, k = 1.
(d) The minimum is Tmin = h 1 = d.
We can also ask what is the maximum average contract length consistent
with a proportion of re-setters h:
max T () s:t:  2 H  h (5)
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Proposition 2 Let max 2 F 1 solve (5). Given the longest contract
duration F , the distribution of contracts that maximizes the average
length of contract subject to a given proportion h of rms resetting
price
maxF =
F
F   1
 
1  h
max1 =
F
F   1
h  1
F   1
with maxi = 0 for i = 2:::F  1: The maximum average contract length
is
Tmax = F
 
1  h+ 1
To understand Propositions 1 and 2, we just need to think of what is gen-
erating the mean duration d and the proportion of rms changing price each
period h. There is the unit interval of rms, divided into proportions with
di¤erent price-spell durations i = 1:::F . Firms with price-spell lengths i will
set prices once every i 1 periods: the longer the price-spell, the more infre-
quently the rm will reset price. Hence, we can have the same proportion
of rms re-setting price (and hence same mean duration) and increase the
mean duration across rms by more longer price-spells. The maximum Tmax
is reached when we have as many F period contracts as possible, consistent
with h. In e¤ect, this means we have a mix of 1 period and F period price-
spells. The existence of a maximum relies on us assuming an upper bound
F : clearly, as F ! 1, Tmax ! 1. The minimum occurs when all rms
have similar price-spells: if d happens to be an integer, then all price-spells
have that length and the two distributions are the same: d = .
4 An application to the UK CPI data8.
In this section, we take the frequency data from the UK and apply the two
propositions to derive the implied upper and lower bounds for the cross-
sectional mean duration. We then estimate the actual distribution and the
corresponding mean and how it compares to the theoretical distributions that
yield the maximum and minimum mean durations across-rms. The dataset
8This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and repro-
duced with the permission of the controller of HMSO and Queens Printer for Scotland.
The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the
ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses
research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates
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we use for is the locally collected CPI price microdata covering the period
January 1996 to December 2007 which is described in detail in the Appendix.
The period covered corresponds to the Great Moderation period when the
frequencies would have been stationary. We also want to see how the level of
disaggregation a¤ects the results. For the UK, we have the following levels
of disaggregation available from the ONS:
 11 COICOP categories
 67 disaggregated COICOP categories.
 570 items.
Each of these disaggregations represents exactly the same data. To get
an idea of the level of aggregation, we can depict the broad 11 COICOP
categories (excluding education which is not included in the VML dataset)
in Table 1. For example, there is the category "food and non-alcoholic bev-
erages" which represents 17.6% of the CPI weight in the subsample available
in the dataset. The second level of disaggregation subdivides these into a
total of 67 COICOP subcategories. For example, within ""food and non-
alcoholic beverages" there are 11 subcategories: 2 for drinks (tea, co¤ee and
cocoa; mineral water, soft drinks and juices) and 9 for food (such as meat,
sh, fruit). The lowest level of disaggregation is the item level. An item is
a particular product or service on which the price observation is made. For
example: canned sweet corn (198g-340g); co¤ee - take-away; fresh lettuce
(iceberg). The 570 items we include are all of the items which were included
throughout the sample period - it excludes old items which were either dis-
continued or new items introduced in this period. These items represent over
66.4% of the total CPI.
Firstly, we present in Table 1 and for each category, we have the fre-
quency data, which gives the proportion of items changing price in a given
month9. The items are weighted by the appropriate CPI weight. The data
are represented in Table 1.
In the rst column of the Table 1 is the COICOP sector, in the second is
the CPI weight for the sector, normalized so that they add up to 100 (since
Education is excluded) and the third the frequency (to three d.p.). In the
fourth we have the minimum average duration (MAD) in that sector from
9In a given month, the percentage of current prices (for items at a location) that are
di¤erent from the price set in the previous month for the same product at the same
location. The gure excludes items for which there was no observation the month before
(e.g. it is the rst price observation of the item at the outlet).
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COICOP Category. CPI adj freq Min Max
Transport 10.4 36.0 2.8 29.2
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 7.1 27.6 3.6 32.9
Clothing and Footwear 9.3 27.2 3.7 33
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 17.6 26.0 3.8 33.6
Furniture and Home Maintenance 11.3 22.7 4.4 35
Communications 0.2 22.5 4.4 35.1
Recreation and Culture 9.9 20.0 5 36.2
Housing and Utilities 8.3 13.7 7.3 39
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 6.5 12.7 7.9 39.4
Restaurants and Hotels 17.5 10.5 9.5 40.4
Health 1.9 10.4 9.6 40.4
Total 100 21.4 4.7 35.6
Table 1: COICOP 11 sectoral frequencies
"Freq" denotes the frequencies of prices changes, which are reported in
percent per month. "CPI adj" denotes the adjusted CPI expenditure weight
of the CPI sectors after excluding the Education sector. "Min" denotes the
minimum average duration. "Max" denotes the maximum average duration
Proposition 1, and in the fth the maximum from Proposition 2 based on
the assumption that the longest price-spell is 44 months.
We next generate the cross-sectional distribution in the whole economy
corresponding to the minimum average duration consistent with the observed
frequencies. From Proposition 1, in each sector we will have one or two
durations with a non-zero share. In Recreation & Culture, since 20% of
prices change per month, there are just 5 month price-spells. In Food &
Non-Alcoholic Beverages there will be a mixture of 20% 3 month and 80% 4
month price-spells. The shortest durations are 2 months (in Transport) and
the longest 10 months (in Health). For each duration, we can then add up
across the 11 sectors to get the weighted cross-sectional distribution. This is
depicted in Figure 1:
We estimate the actual cross-sectional distribution as in Dixon (2012)
using the hazard function. We can see that the distributions are completely
di¤erent, although derived from exactly the same data. The "minimum du-
ration" distribution has no 1 month, 6 month, 11 month or 12 month du-
rations; the most common durations are 4 months (32% ), then followed by
the 3 months (16%) and 5 months (14%). Among the rest, we nd that the
share of distribution coincidently according with the length of duration, such
as 10 months (10%) and 9 months (9%), 8 months (8%), 7 months (7%), 2
9
Figure 1: Actual DAF vs. minumum duration distribution
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Mean DAF Median DAF
True 10.9 7.8
11_min 5.5 4
67_min 6.1 4.5
570_min 6.7 5.8
Table 2: The minimum mean and median duration accross rms comparison
"True" denotes the actual cross-sectional distribution implied by hazard
function, "11_min", "67_min", and "570_min" denote the cross-sectional
distributions derived from the "minimum method" at di¤erent
disaggregation level, corresponding to 11 COICOP categories,67
disaggregated COICOP categories,and 570 items respectively. "Mean DAF"
and "Median DAF" denote the mean and median length of duration across
rms, and both of them are in unit of month.
months (2%). In contrast, the "true" distribution is much atter with a long
tale (which we have truncated at 24 months). The most common duration
is 1 month (10.3%) closely followed by 2 months (8.5%). There is an an-
nual spike at 12 months (4%). Whilst the longer durations tend it have lower
shares the cross-sectional distribution is non-monotonic. The maximum du-
ration distribution is to have a mix of one month and the maximum duration
(44 months). As a rst approximation, the share of the one month durations
in each sector is a little less than the frequency. This is clearly very di¤erent
from the actual distribution.
We can now see what the e¤ect of further disaggregation is on the "mini-
mum duration" distributions: we perform the same procedure for the COICOP
67 and the 570 item level. These are all depicted in Figure 2, along with the
COICOP 11 and the true distribution. They share some common features
when compared to the true distribution: they all put too little weight on
month 1, month 12, and after. They all put too much weight on months 3-5
and months 9 and 10. However, they are also quite di¤erent. The level of
disaggregation clearly matters when constructing a possible cross-sectional
distribution. We can see this from the mean and median durations in Table
2.
These are far too short, reecting the fact that the minimum duration
distributions put a large weight on the shorter distributions and do not have
a long fat tail as in the data. In fact, the minimum durations are just over
half the actual mean duration.
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Figure 2: Actual DAF vs. minimum duration distribution.
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4.1 Calvo distributions.
Clearly, the "minimum duration" distributions corresponding to Proposition
1 do not look at all like the true distribution. In this section we look at
the distribution generated by the hypothesis that the sectoral frequencies
are generated by a Calvo distribution. Again, as in the previous section, we
are looking at exactly the same data, just at di¤erent levels of aggregation.
Within each sector k = 1:::N , we observe a sectoral frequency of hk. As
shown in Dixon and Kara (2006), this corresponds to the cross-sectional
distribution for that sector k = fikg1i=1 where:
ki = i:h
2
k(1  hk)i 1 (6)
Each sector has a CPI weight ck. We can then aggregate across the N
sectors using the CPI weights to get the share of each duration across all
sectors  = fig1i=1 where:
i =
NX
k=1
ckki (7)
The mean duration of the Calvo distribution at the sectoral level is10:
TCk = 2h
 1
k   1: (8)
The mean of the aggregate distribution is thus:
T =
NX
k=1
ck T
C
k
This is the method used in Dixon and Kara (2010, 2011) for generating the
Bils-Klenow distribution based on the Bils Klenow (2004) appendix dataset
of 350 sectoral frequencies for the US.
It is important to note that by assuming a Calvo distribution, we are not
assuming a Calvo pricing model within each sector. We are simply describing
the distribution of price-spell durations in each sector generated by a constant
hazard rate that is equal to the sectoral frequency. This is purely descriptive
of the distribution. It is perfectly compatible with a Taylor model, where
within each sector the length of the price-spells is known ex ante. What we
are doing in e¤ect is constructing  = fig1i=1 using (7): that means we take
out all of the i duration spells from each sector k and put them together
10Dixon and Kara (2006), Theorem 1.
13
Figure 3: Calvo distributions at di¤erent levels of aggregation vs. Actual
DAF.
into a "duration sector" i, which includes all of the price-spells of length
i in the economy. The key di¤erence between the Calvo and Taylor pricing
frameworks is that under Taylor the rms know the length of the price-spell
when they set the price, whereas in the Calvo they do not.
In Figure 3, we represent the Calvo distributions at di¤erent levels of
aggregation: the one sector "aggregate Calvo" (AC) distribution based on
the mean UK frequency of 0.2140; the 11 sector COICOP, the 67 sector
CIOCOP and the 570 item level. We have truncated the theoretical Calvo
distributions at 44 months.
The rst observation is that the level of aggregation inuences the shape
of the aggregate distribution. The distributions all have a "hump" shape,
which peaks at 2 months (COICOP 67 and Item 570) , 3 months (COICOP
11), and 4 months(AC). They all have far too few one-month shares and
of course miss the 12 month spike, as pointed out by Alvarez and Burriel
(2010). However, from month 8, CIOCOP 67 and Item 570 both track the
true distribution fairly well (except for month 12). AC and COICOP 11 both
14
Mean DAF Median DAF
True 10.9 7.8
11c 9.1 6.8
67c 10.5 7.2
570c 10.8 7.8
ac 8.3 6.5
Table 3: Mean and median durations of Calvo distributions
"True" denotes the actual cross-sectional distribution implied by hazard
function, "ac","11c", "67c", and "570c" denote the cross-sectional
distributions derived from the "Calvo distribution" at di¤erent aggregate
level, corresponding to one aggregate sector, 11 COICOP categories,67
disaggregated COICOP categories,and 570 items respectively. "Mean DAF"
and "Median DAF" denote the mean and median length of duration across
rms, and both of them are in unit of month.
overestimate the share of durations between 3 months and 16 months, and
they underestimate the share of durations longer than 16 months. However,
COICOP 11 is relatively closer to the true distribution than AC. If we look
at the Item 570 Calvo distribution, the most disaggregated one we have,
this peaks at month 2 and is the only Calvo distribution to be roughly close
to (a little less than) the true proportion of 1 months. Furthermore, the
Calvo distribution generated by Item 570 is quite similar from the months
2 onwards, only missing the 12 months spike. The UK distribution has a
fatter tail, but the Calvo tails are certainly quite substantial. Essentially,
the Calvo distributions put too much weight on the shorter months (2-7)
and hence puts less weight on the remaining durations.11
The means and medians of the di¤erent Calvo distributions are listed in
Table 3. Here we can see that as the category becomes more disaggregated,
the mean and median of Calvo distributions become closer to the true distri-
bution. Indeed, the Calvo distribution generated by Item 570 almost has the
same mean and median value as what we get from the true distribution. If
we compare the means of the Calvo distributions, these are linked to the dis-
tributions in Table 1, since the mean of the minimum duration distribution
is
Tmin =
NX
k=1
ckh
 1
k
11We then look at the sectoral data to see what the sectoral distributions actually look
like. Most of these do not t the Calvo implied distribution. We use a Komogorov-Smirnov
test to conrm this nding. See appendix 2 for the details.
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which yields the theoretical relation TC = 2: Tmin   1. Hence the Calvo
means are similar to the actual mean, whilst the theoretical minimum is
just over half. No such exact relation holds for the medians. If we look at
Tables 2 and 3, we can see that the Calvo means are less than the theoretical
means. This is because we have truncated the Calvo distributions at 44
months: if we extend this then the mean will approach its theoretical value.
Truncation reduces the mean quite signicantly, since the long tail of the
Calvo distribution will be allocated to the 44th month: whilst the shares of
these longer durations are small, they are long and so a¤ect the mean.
Whilst the Calvo assumption gives us a mean that is about right, it
di¤ers considerably from the true distribution. There are not enough one-
period price-spells: in the data, there are a lot of products that have perfectly
exible prices that change almost every month (petrol, vegetables etc.) Hence
the rst period hazard rate needs to be higher than in the standard Calvo
model. Second there are too many 3-8 month spells. This implies that the
hazard needs to be lower for these months. Then of course there is a 12
month peak.
In fact we can get a very good approximation to the monthly DAF if we
do the following "simplied" hazard function:
 allow for a high and declining hazard for months 1-4.(h1 = 0:41; h2 =
0:29; h3 = h4 = 0:22)
 When the length of duration less than a year , the hazard is constant
at hi = 0:16 for 5  i  11:
 There is a 12 month peak: h12 = 0:2:
 Thereafter, we the hazard is constant at hi = 0:125 or i > 12:
We can depict the "true" hazard and the "simplied" hazard in Figure
4. And accordingly, we can have the true cross-sectional distribution (DAF)
and the one implied from the "simplied" hazard in Figure 5.
We can also look at the distributions within each of the 11 COICOP
sectors. This we do in Appendix 3. There is considerable heterogeneity in the
sectoral distributions. Whilst most have a 12 month peak, there are several
sectors which have little if any 12 month peak in the DAF or hazard: these
latter include Food and non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages, clothing
and footwear, communication. Also, there are sectors which have peaks
other than 12 months which are important: housing and utilities has peaks
every 4 months, communications at 5-6, 11 and 18 months. We compare
each sectoral distribution with the corresponding Calvo distribution. Since
16
Figure 4: True and simplied hazard
17
Figure 5: True and simplied DAF.
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we have such a large data set, the formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects
the null hypothesis that the two distributions are the same in all of the 11
sectors. We also measure the degree of "overlap" of the two distributions
for each sector. That is, the extent to which the two distributions allocate
the same mass to the same values: it is the sum of the absolute deviations
for each value (in this case number of months) relative to the total mass. A
value of 1 means that there is no overlap at all: 0 that they are identical.
In the case of the distributions, the di¤erence is as low as 0.18 for Alcoholic
beverages, 0.20 for restaurants & hotels, and 0.23 for transportation. For the
rest it is over 0.30 peaking at 0.58 for Health. Given that there must be some
overlap here (all of the values for both distributions are strictly positive for
months 1-44), these gures indicate a wide divergence in most sectors. In
conclusion, we can say that the Calvo distribution is not a good description
of the data either at the aggregate level or the COICOP 11 level.
5 The Simulation of di¤erent pricing models.
We have found that the we can use the sectoral frequencies to generate the
corresponding hypothetical Calvo distributions. For the UK data at least,
we nd that at high levels of disaggregation, the resultant hypothetical ag-
gregate distribution matches the true distribution quite well in terms of both
the mean and the median. There are signicant di¤erences, most notably the
hypothetical distribution has no 12 month spike and too few exible prices.
Since the mean and median are close, do the di¤erences matter at the ag-
gregate level? If we simulate a DSGE macro model using the hypothetical
Calvo distribution, will it yield a good approximation to the simulations us-
ing the true distribution found in the UK data? If the answer is "yes", then
it implies that the absence of the 12 month spike and too few exible prices
does not matter from the perspective of the macroeconomic properties of the
DSGE model. This would validate the approach taken in Dixon and Kara
(2010,2011) and Kara (2011) which used the hypothetical Calvo distribu-
tion derived from the Bils-Klenow table of sectoral frequencies in order to
calibrate their US pricing models.
We will perform our simulations using two DSGEmodels: a simple Quan-
tity Theory model (QT) and the Smets andWouters (2003) (SW) model. We
will look at two pricing models in both of these cases: the Generalized Taylor
(GT) and Generalized Calvo (GC) model as in Dixon and Le Bihan (2012).
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5.1 Price setting.
There are two general time-dependent models which are capable of reecting
the underlying distribution found in the micro-data: the Generalized Taylor
(GT)12 and Generalized Calvo (GC) models13. The key di¤erence between
the models is that in the GT the rms know how long the price spell will
last when they set the price, and so each duration of price-spell will have
a di¤erent reset price. In the GC, in contrast, the rms do not know how
long the price spell will last and have a distribution over possible price-spells
durations. All rms have the same distribution and hence there is only one
reset price every period as in the simple Calvo model. In the Generalized
Taylor Economy (GT ) there are N sectors, i = 1; :::; N: In sector i there are
i period contracts: each period a cohort of i 1 of the rms in the sector sets
a new price (or wage). If we think of the economy as a continuum of rms,
we can describe the GT as a vector of sector shares: i is the proportion
of rms that have price-spells of length i. If the longest observed price-spell
is F , then we have
PF
i=1 i = 1 and  2 F 1 is the F -vector of shares
 = figFi=1. We can think of the "sectors" as "duration sectors": we can
classify the economy by the length of price-spells. The essence of the Taylor
model is that when they set the price, rms know exactly how long its price
is going to last. The simple Taylor economy is a special case where there is
only one length of price-spell (e.g. 2 = 1 is a simple Taylor "2 quarters"
economy).
The log-linearised equation for the aggregate price pt is a weighted average
of the sectoral prices pit, where the weights are i :
pt =
FX
i=1
ipit (9)
In each sector i, a proportion i 1 of the i rms reset their price at each
period. Assuming imperfect competition and standard demand curve, the
optimal reset price in sector i; xit is given by the rst-order condition of
an intertemporal prot-maximisation program under the constraint implied
by price rigidity. The log-linearised equation for the reset price, as in the
standard Taylor set-up, is then given by :
xit =
 
1Pi 1
k=0 
k
!
i 1X
k=0
kEtp

t+k (10)
12See Taylor 1993, Coenen et al. 2007, Dixon and Kara 2010, 2011.
13See Wolman 1999, Mash 2003 and 2004, Guerrieri 2006, Sheedy 2010, Paustian and
von Hagen 2008.
20
where  is a discount factor, Et is the expectation operator conditional on
information available at date t, and pt+k is the optimal ex price at time
t+ k. The reset price is thus an average over the optimal ex prices for the
duration of the contract (or price-spell). The formula for the optimal ex
price will depend on the model: clearly, it is a markup on marginal cost. We
will specify the exact log-linearised equation for the optimal ex-price when
we specify the exact macroeconomic model we use.
The sectoral price is simply the average over the i cohorts in the sector:
pit =
1
i
i 1X
k=0
xit k (11)
In each period, a proportion h of rms reset their prices in this economy:
proportion  1 of sector i which is of size i resulting in equality (3).
In the GC, rms have a common set of duration-dependent reset prob-
abilities: the probability of resetting price i periods after you last reset the
price is given by hi. This is a time-dependent model, and the prole of reset
probabilities is h = fhigFi=1. Clearly, if F is the longest price-spell we have
hF = 1 and hi 2 [0; 1) for i = 1:::F   1. Again, the duration data can be
represented by the hazard function. Estimated hazard function can then be
used to calibrate h. Since any distribution of durations can be represented
by the appropriate hazard function, we can choose the GCE to exactly t
micro-data.
In economic terms, the di¤erence between the Calvo approach and the
Taylor approach is that when the rm sets its price, it does not know how
long its price is going to last. Rather, it has a survivor function S(i) which
gives the probability that its price will last at up to i periods. The survivor
function in discrete time is14:
S(1) = 1 (12)
S(i) =
i 1Y
j=1
(1  hj) i = 2; :::; F
Thus, when they set the price in period t, the rms know that they will last
one period with certainty, at least 2 periods with probability S(2) and so
on. The Calvo model is a special case where the hazard is constant hi = h,
S(i) = (1 h)i 1 and F =1. Of course, in any actual data set, F is nite.
14Note that the discrete time survivor function e¤ectively assumes that all "failures"
occur at the end of the period (or the start of the next period): this corresponds to
the pricing models where the price is set for a whole period and can only change at the
transition from one period to the next.
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In the GC model the reset price is common across all rms that reset
their price. The optimal reset price, in the same monopolistic competition
set-up as mentioned above, is given in log-linearised form by:
xt =
1PF
i=1 S(i)
i 1
FX
i=1
S(i)i 1Etpt+i 1 (13)
The evolution of the aggregate price-level is given by:
pt =
FX
i=1
S(i)xt i+1 (14)
That is, the current price level is constituted by the surviving reset prices of
the present and previous F   1 periods.
5.2 A simple quantity theory model with price-setting.
We will rst examine the GC and GT models of prices in a quantity theory
model with labour as the only input of production. This model has the great
advantage being very simple, because almost all its dynamic properties are
generated by the pricing models alone. DSGE models like the SW model in
contrast are quite complicated with dynamic properties emerging from the
interaction of pricing with many other features of the model. The model we
present is in its log-linearised version (see Ascari 2003, Dixon and Kara 2010
for the derivation from microeconomic foundation).
To model the demand side, we use the constant-veloticity Quantity The-
ory:
yt = mt   pt
where (pt; yt) are aggregate price and output and mt the money supply. We
model the monetary growth process as an autoregressive process of order one
AR (1) :
mt = mt 1 + "t
"t = "t 1 + t
where t is a white noise error term (e¤ectively a monetary growth shock).
Following Chari et al( 2000) we set  = 0:5:
The optimal exible price pt at period t in all sectors is given by:
pt = pt + yt (15)
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Figure 6: IRF of money growth shock in Quantity Theory model for GTE
price-setting.
The key parameter  captures the sensitivity of the exible price to output15.
As discussed in Dixon and Kara (2010), there are a range of calibrated and
estimated values for : for illustrative purposes, we use the "moderate" case
of  = 0:1 as in Mankiw and Reis (2002). As shown by Ascari (2003) and
Edge (2002), the value of  can be interpreted as resulting from either wage
or price-setting.
In Figures 6 and 7, we see the IRFs for the QT model responding to a
monetary 1% monetary growth shock. As we can see, the IRFs look similar
in shape for both the GC and GT: for both output and ination. There are
four IRFs reecting the distributions generated from the estimated ("true")
15This can be due to increasing marginal cost and/or an upward sloping supply curve
for labour. See for example Walsh (2003, chapter 5) and Woodford (2003, chapter 3).
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Figure 7: IRF of money growth shock in Quantity Theory model for GCE
price-setting.
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GTE GCE
True
-11c
True
-67c
True
-570c
True
-11c
True
-67c
True
-570c
AD in
output
9.12% 8.73% 21.82% 4.34% 14.41% 21.42%
AD in
ination
9.93% 5.36% 11.87% 9.01% 7.99% 10.49%
Table 4: The average relative di¤erence AD in IRF from QT model
"True" denotes the actual cross-sectional distribution implied by hazard func-
tion, "11c", "67c", and "570c" denote the cross-sectional distributions de-
rived from the "Calvo distribution" at di¤erent aggregate level, correspond-
ing to 11 COICOP categories, 67 disaggregated COICOP categories, and 570
items respectively.
UK distribution, and the three Calvo distributions derived from the sectoral
frequencies at di¤erent levels of aggregation. The results are striking. We
can summarize them in a few points:
(a) the IRFs from the four distributions are similar, with the "true" IRF
lying in the middle.
(b) the 570-item Calvo has the largest and most persistent e¤ect on out-
put, followed by the 67 COICOP Calvo, then the "true" and the 11 COICOP
Calvo showing the least e¤ect.
(c) for ination, the 11COICOP has the biggest immediate e¤ect, while
it dies out relatively faster than the other cases. The 570-item Calvo has the
smallest immediate e¤ect, but it has the most persistent e¤ect. The "true"
and 67 COICOP Calvo lie between those two.
(d) the GT has a hump shaped reaction function for ination, the GC
does not.
In order to quantify di¤erences between the IRFs, we dene the point-
by-point absolute di¤erence as a percentage of the mean "true" IRF i =
jIRFtrue IRFcalvoj
mean(IRFtrue)
 100%: Summing these di¤erences over the rst 20Q i
(i = 1;    ; 20) and dividing by 20, we can get the average relative di¤er-
ence (AD), which is shown in the Table 4.
Here we can see that with the GT model, the IRF generated by the
COICOP 67 frequencies is the one most close to those generated from "true"
distribution. However, in the GC model, the results are kind of mix. For the
IRF in output, the COICOP 11 is the one has the smallest average di¤erence.
While for the IRF in ination, the COICOP 67s performance is the best.
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Figure 8: IRF for monetary shock in SW model with GTE price-setting.
5.3 A DSGE model: Smets and Wouters (2003)
In this section, we use the Smets and Wouters (2003) model of the euro area
commonly employed for monetary policy analysis. The SW model is much
more complicated than the simple QT model we have just used: there are
many sources of dynamics other than prices and wages, including capital
adjustment, capital utilization, consumer dynamics with habit formation,
and a monetary policy reaction function. The behavior of the model is the
outcome of the interaction of all of these processes together as it should be
in a DSGE model. Hence the e¤ect of pricing dynamics is not isolated as in
the simple QT framework of the previous section. The details of the model
and calibration are outlined in Dixon and Le Bihan (2012) using a notation
consistent with this paper, and the Dynare program can be downloaded from
huwdixon.org.
We depict the IRFs for an interest rate shock, which causes output and
ination to fall initially (as shown in Figures 8 and 9. Here we see that
26
Figure 9: IRF for monetary shock in SW model with GCE price-setting.
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GTE GCE
True
-11c
True
-67c
True
-570c
True
-11c
True
-67c
True
-570c
AD in
output
2.58% 0.88% 3.58% 3.71% 1.28% 3.58%
AD in
ination
3.08% 0.89% 3.27% 6.12% 2.06% 2.34%
Table 5: The average relative di¤erence AD in IRF from SW model
"True" denotes the actual cross-sectional distribution implied by hazard func-
tion, "11c", "67c", and "570c" denote the cross-sectional distributions de-
rived from the "Calvo distribution" at di¤erent aggregate level, correspond-
ing to 11 COICOP categories, 67 disaggregated COICOP categories, and 570
items respectively.
the di¤erences between the 4 IRFs are much smaller and less visible when
compared to the QT model. This is probably because the structure on the
dynamics is also determined by the rest of the models complex dynamics,
which leaves less room for the precise distribution of price-spell durations to
matter. The AD are shown in the Table 5 and are quite small compared to
the AD in the QT model.
If we take the results from the simulations of both the QT model and the
SW model, we can see that the microeconomic di¤erences in durations do
not matter that much. We are comparing hypothetical distributions derived
from the sectoral frequencies under the assumption that within each sector
there is a Calvo distribution corresponding to the frequency. As we have seen,
whilst the aggregate distributions implied by this may have a similar mean
and median to the true distribution, the shape di¤ers signicantly and in
particular there is no 12 month spike. The results of the simulations implies
that these micro di¤erences do not matter in practice. In the SW model, the
di¤erences in distribution seem to have almost no observable e¤ect on the
IRFs.
Why is it that the hypothetical Calvo distributions seem to work well
despite their poor t at the microeconomic level. We believe that there is
one prime reason for this: the macroeconomic models use a quarterly cali-
bration, which in e¤ect smooths out some of the di¤erences we observed in
the monthly data. From the perspective of GTE, for example, the 12 month
spike gets smoothed out. This is shown in the Figure 10, in which the"true"
quarterly distribution is compared to the corresponding quarterly distribu-
tions for the "11c", "67c", "570c" distributions and "ac" the distribution
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Figure 10: Quarterly distribution comparison.
implied by the single aggregate Calvo frequency. The quarterly "True" dis-
tribution is monotonic and has no 4 quarter spike. And the Calvo implied
distributions at di¤erent aggregate level are all quite similar to the "True"
one, except for the "ac" which has a big hump in quarter 2.
If we look at the quarterly model from the perspective of the GCE, we
need to compare the quarterly hazards for the Calvo pricing at di¤erent ag-
gregate level and the "True" one which is from an estimated hazard function.
Following Dixon (2012), given a distribution across rms  2 F 1, the cor-
responding hazard prole that will generate this distribution in steady state
is given by h 2 [0; 1]F 1 where:
hi =
i
i
 
FX
j=i
j
j
! 1
(16)
Therefore, we can calculate the monthly hazard for the Calvo pricing at
di¤erent aggregate level by using the equation 16, and the relevant monthly
survival rate will be obtained accordingly. This can then be converted into
a quarterly hazard rate.
We plot the quarterly hazard functions in the Figure 11. The hazard func-
tions from Calvo pricing at di¤erent aggregate levels are smoothly downward
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Figure 11: Quarterly hazards comparison.
sloping 16 resulting from aggregation of heterogenous price setters (see Al-
varez 2008). The "true" hazard function is also generally downward sloping,
with several small spikes. In general, the hazards from di¤erent disaggregate
level of Calvo pricing are quite similar to the "true" hazard. The aggregate
Calvo on the other hand has a constant hazard and looks quite unlike the
"true" hazard.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we asked the question what can the sectoral data on the fre-
quency of price-change tell us? On the theoretical level, sectoral frequencies
tell us what expected duration of a price-spell is. This is of some interest,
but from a macroeconomic perspective we are more interested in the behav-
ior of the economic agents setting prices - the cross-sectional distribution is
16The Calvo implied hazards are generally downward sloping. However, after 12 quar-
ters, these hazards become upward sloping. This is due to the truncation. For Calvo
pricing, truncation means that the
PF
j=i
j
j is smaller than it is under the innite sum.
The reciprocal of the smaller sum is the main reason that the hazard is biased upwards
and results in an upward sloping hazard after 12 quarters.
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of much more interest. Unfortunately the frequency itself says little about
the cross-sectional distribution: to uncover this we need to make additional
assumptions. However, we are able to say what the theoretical minimum
cross-sectional mean duration is consistent with an observed frequency: it is
the mean duration of a price-spell which occurs when all price-spells in the
sector have the same or almost the same length. However, the cross-sectional
mean can be much longer: intuitively, rms that have prices that last for a
long time do not reset their prices very often. These rms contribute little
to the monthly frequency but add a lot to the cross-sectional mean.
When we look at the UK data using an estimated hazard function, we
nd that the UK data is a long way from the distribution implied by the
theoretical minimum. Looking at di¤erent levels of disaggregation, we nd
that whilst the minimum theoretical mean duration is around 5.5-6.7 months,
the actual data reveals a mean of almost 11 months. We also nd that the
more disaggregated the data, the closer are both the median and mean to
the true values. We also look at the aggregate data using the hypothesis that
the sectoral frequencies are generated by a Calvo distribution. Under this
assumption, the cross-sectional mean is much larger than the minimum, and
gets closer to the actual mean as you become more disaggregated, with the
most disaggregated having almost exactly the same mean and median as the
data. Whilst the mean and median of the hypothetical Calvo distribution
can be close to the actual values, the shape di¤ers in two distinct ways: rstly,
there is no 12 month spike, secondly there are not enough exible prices.
When we look at the COICOP 11 sectors, we nd that the Calvo distribution
hypothesis does not work very well: there is considerable heterogeneity across
sectors in terms of the cross-sectional distribution and hazard function.
However, we do nd that whilst the Calvo distribution hypothesis di¤ers
from the estimated distribution both at the aggregate and sectoral levels, it
nonetheless works at the aggregate level. This is because of a combination
of two factors. First, along with getting the mean and median correct, the
Calvo distribution also generates a nice long fat tail. Second, DSGE models
are calibrated using quarterly periods rather than monthly: when we move to
quarterly data, the di¤erences which look signicant at the monthly level get
averaged out to a large extent. This means that when we look at the behavior
of DSGE models under the Calvo distribution hypothesis, they behave in a
very similar way to models calibrated with the microdata. This suggests
that we can use the disaggregated frequency data (the more disaggregated
the better) to calibrate DSGE models when we do not have reliable hazard
function estimates or access to the price microdata as was done by Dixon
and Kara (2010, 2011).
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8 Appendix:
8.1 Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1.. Firstly we will prove (a) and (b). We do this
by contradiction. Let us suppose that the solution such that k > 0 and
j > 0 and k   j  2 We will then show that there is another feasible
0 2 H  h with j > 0 and j+1 > 0 which generates a shorter average
contract length.
For the proposed solution ; the two sectors k and j have sector shares
satisfying:
k + j =  = 1 
FX
i=1;i6=j;k
i (17)
k
k
+
j
j
=  = h 
FX
i=1;i6=j;k
i
i
 is the total share of the two sectors:  is the contribution of these two
sectors to h. Since k > j,  > j; hence we can rewrite (17) as
j =
kj
k   j   
j
k   j  (18)
k =   kj
k   j  +
k
k   j 
Hence we can choose
 
0j; 
0
j+1

which satises satises (18), but yields a
lower average contract length:
0j = j (j + 1)    j (19)
0j+1   j+1 = (j + 1)  j (j + 1) 
Dene j+1 = 0j+1   j+1: What we are doing is redistributing the total
proportion  over durations j and j + 1 so that the aggregate proportion of
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rms resetting the price is the same: 02H  h ;since (19) is equivalent to
(18) implies
j+1 + 
0
j =  (20)
j+1
k
+
0j
j
= 
0 has a lower average contract length. Since we leave the proportions of
other durations constant, their contribution to the average contract length
is unchanged. From (18) the contribution of durations k and j is given by
Tk = kak + jj =  (k + j)  kj
Likewise the contribution with 0 is given by
Tj = (j + 1)j+1 + j
0
j =  (2j + 1)  (j + 1) j
Hence (noting that  > j):
Tk   Tj+1 =  (k + j   2j   1)   (kj   (j + 1) j)
>  [j (k   j   1)  kj + (j + 1) j] = 0
That is T ()  T (0) = Tk   Tj+1 > 0 the desired contradiction. To prove
(c) for su¢ ciency, if h 1 = k 2 Z+, then k = 1 2 H
 
h

: If k < 1 any
other element of H
 
h

must involve strictly positive j and i with j i  2,
which contradicts the parts (a) and (b) of the proposition already established.
For necessity, note that if h 1 =2 Z+; then no solution with only one contract
length can yield the observed proportion of rms resetting prices.
Proof or Proposition 2. Assume the contrary, that there is a distribution
 with i > 0 where 1 < i < F which solves (5). Redistribute the weight on
sector i between f1; Fg in order to ensure that we remain in H  h so that:
1 +
F
F
=
i
i
; 1 +F = i
which implies:
F = i
F (i  1)
i (F   1);1 = i
F   i
i (F   1)
Hence:
T = i

F (i  1)
i (F   1) (F   i) 
F   i
i (F   1) (i  1)

=
i (i  1) (F   1)
i (F   1) [F   1] > 0
The desired contradiction. Given that all contracts must be either 1 or F
periods long, the rest of the proposition follows by simple algebra.
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8.2 Data description
The data is described in some detail by Bunn and Ellis (2009, 2012) so our
description will be brief. The ONS collect a longitudinal micro data set
of monthly price quotes from over ten thousands of outlets to compute the
national index of consumer prices. There are two basic price collection meth-
ods: local and central. Local collection is used for most items. The UK was
divided into its standard regions (eg Wales, East Midlands etc) and a num-
ber of locations are random selected in each region according to the total
expenditure for the region. There are about 150 locations around the UK,
and around 120,000 quotations are obtained each month by local collection.
For some items, collection in individual shops across the 150 locations is not
required- for example, for larger chain stores who have a national pricing
policy or where the price is the same for all UK residents or the regional
variation in prices can be collected centrally. The data that we were able
to access for this study via the VML at Newport (Wales) consists of the
locally collected data covering about two thirds of total CPI (centrally col-
lected data covers about 33% of CPI). The sample spans over the time period
from January 1996 to December 2007 and contains between 112,676 (1996)
and 99,524 (2007) elementary price quotations per month, with a resulting
dataset of around 14 million price observations. The coverage and classica-
tion of the CPI indices are based on the international classication system
for household consumption expenditures known as COICOP (classication of
individual consumption by purpose). This is a hierarchical classication sys-
tem comprising: divisions e.g. 01 Food and non-alcoholic beverages, groups
e.g. 01.1 Food, and classes ( the lowest published level) e.g. 01.1.1 Bread
and cereals. As table 6 shows, the division Food and non-alcoholic beverages
accounts for about 17% of the CPI weight in the subsample available in the
dataset. Education is not contained in the VML dataset, as these prices
are all collected centrally: but all other CPI divisions have locally collected
observations and are included in the dataset.
In our CPI research data set, each individual price quote consists of infor-
mation on the item code, the outlet, the region, the date etc. The product
category at the elementary level is dened as an item - for example large
loaf, white, unsliced (800g). However, the data has been anonymized with
respect to the variety and brand of the product. With the information on
the item i, the shop j, the location k, and the date t, we can construct a
price trajectory Pijk;t, which is sequence of price quotes for a specic item
belonging to a product category in a specic shop over time. Specically,
we take two sequential price quotes belong to the same price trajectory if
the they have the same product identity, location and shop code. There are
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COICOP division Freq. Percent Cum.
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 25,191.51 17.62 17.62
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 10,083.28 7.05 24.67
Clothing and Footwear 13,323.33 9.32 33.98
Housing and Utilities 9,350.23 6.54 40.52
Furniture and Home Maintenance 16,211.75 11.34 51.86
Health 2,705.55 1.89 53.75
Transport 14,800.15 10.35 64.1
Communications 237.2797 0.17 64.27
Recreation and Culture 14,085.51 9.85 74.12
Education 6.340364 0 74.12
Restaurants and Hotels 25,087.06 17.54 91.67
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 11,918.02 8.33 100
Total 143,000 100
Table 6: CPI share in COICOP sectors
about 614; 000 price trajectories. And the average length of each price tra-
jectory is about 24 months. Each trajectory will consist of a sequence of
one or more price-spells: there are 3,174,692 price-spells in the data (i.e. on
average about 5 price-spells per trajectory).
8.3 Comparing sectoral distribution of DAF with dis-
tribution of Calvo
This section examines the distribution of the duration of price spells at the
COICOP 11 sectoral level. As in the aggregate data, we estimate the sec-
toral hazard functions using the KM non-parametric method and the corre-
sponding cross-sectional DAF. The exact method is the same as Dixon and
Le Bihan (2012) and is described in detail in Dixon (2012): in brief, we
estimate the non-parametric KM estimator excluding all left-censored data
and treating right-censoring as the end of a price-spell. We then compare
these with the sectoral Calvo distributions in three ways. First, and most
straightforwardly, we comparing the distribution of DAF with distribution
of Calvo in each of 11 COICOP sectors with the "eye ball test". Even
though this is not a strict statistical test, it can give us an impression how
close or how far the two kind of distributions are di¤erent. Second, we ex-
amine the distributional assumption using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic quanties a distance between the empirical
distribution function of the sample and the cumulative distribution function
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of the reference distribution (in our case, the reference distribution is Calvo
distribution). Since we have such a large sample of price spells, this is a very
strict test: standard errors are very small so that even small deviations of the
reference distribution will lead to its rejection. Third, we propose a method
to calculate the relative absolute di¤erence. Instead of calculating the di¤er-
ence with the cumulative distribution function like Kolmogrov-Smirnov test,
we compute the sum of the absolute di¤erences between the two probability
density distributions relative to their combined mass of 2. This method can
provide us with a measure of how much the two distributions di¤er: this is a
descriptive statistic rather than a test, but captures the extent of "overlap".
8.3.1 Distribution graphs: DAF vs. Calvo
As the distribution graphs show, there are signicant di¤erences between
the distribution of DAF and the distribution of Calvo in most COICOP
sectors. First, the Calvo distribution has less one-period price-spells than
DAF, indicating that Calvo price setting mechanism fails to replicate the
evidence of large volumn of exible price setters. Second, there is no 12-
month spike in the Calvo distribution. But this 12-month spike does appear
in all COICOP sectors, it is absent in health, housing, culture, etc. Third, in
most sectors the DAF has a fatter tail compared to the Calvo distribution.
The comparisons between the actual cross-sectional distribution with the
Calvo distribution in each COICOP sector can be shown as Figure 12-Figure
14.
8.3.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for a given cumulative distribution func-
tion F (x) is
Dn = sup
x
jFn (x)  F (x) j
where sup x is the supremum of the set of distances. By the Glivenko-Cantelli
theorem, if the sample comes from distribution F (x), then Dn converges to 0
almost surely. Kolmogorov strengthened this result, by e¤ectively providing
the rate of this convergence. In practice, the statistic requires relatively large
number of data to properly reject the null hypothesis.
Under null hypothesis that the sample comes from the hypothesized dis-
tribution F (x), p
nDn
n!1! sup
t
jB (F (t)) j
in distribution, whereB (t) is the Brownian bridge. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test is constructed by using the critical values of the Kolmogorov distribution.
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Figure 12: DAF vs. Calvo in each COICOP sector
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Figure 13: DAF vs. Calvo in each COICOP sector (cont).
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Figure 14: DAF vs. Calvo in each COICOP sector. (cont).
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COICOP Sectors Distance K-alpha/sqrt(n) Test result
Food & Beverages 0.293 0.009 Reject null
Alcoholic & Tobacco 0.130 0.060 Reject null
Clothing & Footwear 0.281 0.060 Reject null
Housing & Utilities 0.401 0.049 Reject null
Furniture & Home 0.377 0.013 Reject null
Health 0.399 0.078 Reject null
Transport 0.161 0.111 Reject null
Communications 0.227 0.136 Reject null
Recreation & Culture 0.337 0.090 Reject null
Restaurants & Hotels 0.105 0.102 Reject null
Miscellaneous 0.295 0.082 Reject null
Table 7: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results.
The null hypothesis is rejected at level  if
p
nDn > K;
where K is found from
Pr (K  K) = 1  :
As described in Table 7, the test results reject that sectoral distribution
of DAF is the same as sectoral Calvo distribution. This result is consistent
with the nding in Matsuoka (2009), who found that over 90 percent of the
429 tested items in the Japanese retail price data for 2000-2005 reject the
hypothesis that the underlying distribution is exponential, which corresponds
to the time-dependent pricing model of Calvo.
8.3.3 Relative di¤erence: DAF vs. Calvo
We propose a new method to calculate the relative absolute di¤erence be-
tween the DAF and the Calvo distribution. We calculate and absolute dif-
ference point-by-point for the probability density function between two dis-
tributions:
di = jfDAF   fCalvoj
and then we add up all the di and let it be divided by 2. We denote the
result as Relative Di¤erence RD :
RD =
PT
i=1 di
2
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COICOP Relative Di¤erence (DAF vs. Calvo)
Food and No-Alcoholic 0.36
Alcoholic and Tobacco 0.18
Clothing and footwear 0.33
Housing and utilities 0.49
Furniture and home maintenance 0.44
Health 0.58
Transportation 0.23
Communication 0.35
Recreation and culture 0.41
Restaurant and hotel 0.20
Miscellaneous goods and services 0.37
Table 8: Relative di¤erence between True and Calvo in each COICOP sector
If the two distributions are identical, the RD = 0. If the two distributions do
not overlap at all (these is no value for which both pdfs are strictly positive),
then RD = 1. The results of relative di¤erence are shown in Table 8. As can
be seen, the RD between the two distributions varies: Whilst some sectors
show a low level of RD (Alcohol and Tobacco) others have a much higher
level (Housing and Utilities, Health).
We also calculate the relative di¤erence for the aggregate distribution of
durations (as shown in Table 9) for the di¤erent levels of disaggregation.
Indeed, the aggregate di¤erences are much less than those at the sectoral
levels. The 67 and 570 Calvo distributions are quite similar to the True
distribution. The relative di¤erences become even smaller when we look at
the quarterly data, suggesting that the di¤erences are averaged out to some
extent.
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Relative Di¤erences (True vs. Calvo)
Monthly data Quarterly data
ac 0.20 0.16
11c 0.12 0.09
67c 0.07 0.05
570c 0.06 0.04
Table 9: Relative di¤erences between the True and Calvo distributions
"True" denotes the actual cross-sectional distribution implied by hazard func-
tion, "ac", "11c", "67c", and "570c" denote the cross-sectional distribu-
tions derived from the "Calvo distribution" at di¤erent aggregate level, cor-
responding to one aggregate sector, 11 COICOP categories, 67 disaggregated
COICOP categories, and 570 items respectively.
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